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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
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WILLIAM D. SPRENKLE; KATHRYN MCVEY; MARC GOLDBERG; TY 
STANTON; TIMOTHY MUSSER 
________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(M.D. Pa. No. 1:17-cv-00003) 
District Judge: Honorable Matthew W. Brann 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 2, 2020 
 
Before: KRAUSE and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges, and BEETLESTONE,* District Judge. 
 
 









* Honorable Wendy Beetlestone, United States District Court for the Eastern District 








KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Rafael Chieke appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of 
his former employer and supervisors, collectively the Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections (DOC), on his various Title VII claims of discrimination, hostile work 
environment, and retaliation, as well as parallel claims brought under the Pennsylvania 
Human Relations Act (PHRA).  For the following reasons, we will affirm.  
I. Discussion1 
We begin with Chieke’s various Title VII and PHRA claims based on events prior 
to October 25, 2015 and February 26, 2016.  Chieke concedes that those claims are time-
barred unless he establishes a “continuing violation,” Mandel v. M & Q Packaging Corp., 
706 F.3d 157, 165 (3d Cir. 2013); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); 43 Pa. Stat. and 
Cons. Stat. Ann. § 959(h), which he attempts to do by arguing that the acts of discrimination 
he allegedly suffered amounted to a hostile work environment.  At issue, however, are 
discrete acts—failure to reclassify, failure to promote, and constructive termination—each 
 
† This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 
not constitute binding precedent. 
 
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367(a) and we 
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review the grant of summary judgment de 
novo and will affirm if “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact” and if, viewing 
the facts in the light most favorable to Chieke, the DOC is nonetheless “entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 425 (3d 




of which is individually actionable and therefore may not be aggregated to make a 
“continuing violation.”2  See O’Connor v. Newark, 440 F.3d 125, 127 (3d Cir. 2006).  
Accordingly, the District Court properly determined that claims based on actions outside 
of the statutory periods were time-barred.  
What remains of Chieke’s disparate treatment and retaliation claims fails on the 
merits.3  Both of these claims are governed by the three-step burden-shifting framework of 
McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).  See Carvalho-Grevious 
v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017) (retaliation); Jones v. Sch. Dist. of 
Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410 (3d Cir. 1999) (disparate treatment).  And regardless of whether 
Chieke established a prima facie case on either claim, both fail at step three—the 
requirement that the plaintiff establish that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason 
proffered by the employer for the adverse action is pretextual, Carvalho-Grevious, 851 
F.3d at 257.    
 
2 Because these “individually actionable allegations cannot be aggregated” to form 
a hostile work environment claim, O’Connor, 440 F.3d at 127, Chieke’s hostile work 
environment claim also fails on the merits.  And in any case, Chieke has not established 
the kind of “severe or pervasive” discrimination required to succeed on that claim.  See 
Jensen v. Potter, 435 F.3d 444, 449 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 
3 In his briefing, Chieke also mentions, but arguably failed to preserve, a 
constructive discharge claim which he only notes in passing and which is not the subject 
of any argument.  See United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  Even if 
this claim is not waived, however, Chieke has not established the elements of a constructive 
discharge claim, which requires evidence that an employer “knowingly permitted 
conditions of discrimination in employment so intolerable that a reasonable person subject 





Here, the DOC proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for failing to 
reclassify Chieke’s position:  At the time of Chieke’s request, the DOC was merging with 
the Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, and there was not an apparent need to 
reclassify his position under that circumstance.  Chieke attempts to establish pretext by 
arguing that because he had consistently received exemplary performance reviews, the 
DOC’s decision to not reclassify his position must have been discriminatory.  But because 
he fails to present evidence “contradicting the core facts” put forward by the DOC, Kautz 
v. Met-Pro Corp., 412 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2005), this assertion is insufficient to meet his 
burden.  Likewise, Chieke failed to rebut the DOC’s nondiscriminatory explanation that it 
denied Chieke’s request for additional staff and funds because Chieke was able to meet his 
goals with current staffing levels.   
II. Conclusion 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment. 
